

FYROM Name Issue

The issue of the name of the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* is not just a dispute over historical facts or symbols. It concerns the conduct of a UN member state, the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, which contravenes the fundamental principles of international law and order; specifically, respect for good neighbourly relations, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The name issue is thus a problem with regional and international dimensions, consisting in the promotion of irredentist and territorial ambitions on the part of the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, mainly through the counterfeiting of history and usurpation of Greece's national and historical heritage.

The name issue arose in 1991, when the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* seceded from Yugoslavia and declared its independence under the name "Republic of Macedonia".

Historically, the term "Macedonia", which is a Greek word, refers to the Kingdom and culture of the ancient Macedonians, who belong to the Hellenic nation and are unquestionably part of Greek historical and cultural heritage.

Geographically, the term "Macedonia" refers to a wider region extending into the current territory of various Balkan countries, with the largest part of the region being in Greece and smaller sections in the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Bulgaria and Albania. The core of what was ancient Macedonia lies within contemporary Greek borders, comprises the northern portion of the Greek state, and is called Macedonia. Some 2.5 million Greeks reside in this region today and they and their forebears have considered and called themselves Macedonians through the centuries.

The roots of the name issue go back to the mid-1940s, when, in the aftermath of the Second World War, Commander in Chief Tito separated from Serbia the region that had been known until that time as Vardar Banovina (today's *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*), giving it the status of a federal unit of the new Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, renaming it, initially, the "People's Republic of Macedonia", and, later, the "Socialist Republic of Macedonia". At the same time, he started to cultivate the idea of a separate and discrete "Macedonian nation".

Tito of course had many reasons for making these moves, the main one being to lay the foundations for future Yugoslavian territorial claims in the wider region of Macedonia and secure an opening on the Aegean. Tito's intentions in the wider Macedonian region had been confirmed as early as 1944, when he declared publicly that his goal was to reunify "all the sections of Macedonia that were broken up in 1912 and 1913 by the Balkan imperialists."

A December 1944 State Department dispatch to the U.S. authorities, signed by the US Secretary of State at the time, Stettinius, noted, among other things, that "This [US] Government considers talk of Macedonian "nation", Macedonian "Fatherland", or Macedonian "national consciousness" to be unjustified demagoguery representing no ethnic, nor political reality, and sees in its present revival a possible cloak for aggressive intentions against Greece."

Against this historical background, the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* declared its independence in 1991, basing its existence as an independent state on the artificial and spurious notion of the

“Macedonian nation”, which was cultivated systematically through the falsification of history and the exploitation of ancient Macedonia purely for reasons of political expediency.

Greece reacted strongly to the theft of its historical and cultural heritage and the treacherous territorial and irredentist intentions of the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, and the issue came before the UN Security Council, which, in two resolutions [817(1993) and 845(1993)] recommended that a settlement be found quickly, for the sake of peaceful relations and good neighbourliness in the region.

In 1993, following a recommendation from the Security Council, the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* was accepted, by decision of the General Assembly, into the United Nations under this provisional name, until such time as an agreed solution is reached.

In 1995, Greece and the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* concluded an Interim Accord, which imposed a binding “code of conduct”.

Based on the Interim Accord, the two sides began negotiations under the auspices of the UN. These negotiations have continued to this day.

In the time that has elapsed since the signing of the Interim Accord, the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* has systematically violated the letter and spirit of the Accord, as well as the obligations deriving from it:

- promoting territorial designs against Greece through the portrayal on maps, in school books, in history books, etc., of Greek territory as being within the territory of a “greater” *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, in violation of articles 2, 3, 4 and 7.1;
- supporting irredentist claims and inciting nationalistic feeling within Greece, in violation of article 6.2;
- using the name “Republic of Macedonia” in international organizations – including the United Nations – that it has joined under the condition that it use the provisional name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, in violation of the relevant commitments provided for in article 11.1 (even on the floor of the UN General Assembly, the then-president of the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* stated that “the name of my country is and shall remain the Republic of Macedonia”);
- using symbols – including the Vergina Sun and other symbols that are part of Greece’s historical and cultural heritage – the use of which is prohibited under article 7.2. Other instances of this violation include the renaming of Skopje’s airport “Alexander the Great”, the raising of statues of Alexander the Great and Philip II, and naming the section of Corridor X that passes through the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia “Alexander the Macedonian”.
- taking or tolerating provocative actions that incite hostility and fanaticism, including desecration of the Greek flag and substitution of the Nazi swastika for the Christian cross, harassment of Greek businesses, businesspersons and tourists, etc., in violation of article 7.1.

A fundamental principle of every negotiation between states is that the involved parties must negotiate in good faith and a constructive spirit, and exhaust every possibility of reaching a compromise solution.

Exhibiting the requisite constructive spirit, Greece proceeded to a major compromise, accepting a compound name with a geographical qualifier for use in relation to everyone (*erga omnes*).

The *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* has so far not responded in kind to this gesture of compromise from Greece, and insists intransigently on its initial position, which it is attempting to impose

de facto internationally, with the result that substantial progress has not been made in the negotiations under way for 16 years under the auspices of the United Nations.

It is obvious that the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's* stance does not allow for the completion of its accession to NATO or the EU, given that these two organizations are founded on the fundamental principles of the UN Charter – including the principle of good neighbourly relations – which the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* does not respect.

Within this framework, at the Bucharest NATO Summit in April 2008, the members of the Alliance decided in a collective and unanimous decision that an accession invitation will be extended to the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* only if the name issue has been resolved in a mutually acceptable manner.

Similarly, the EU decided at the June 2008 European Council, in a collective and unanimous decision, that the resolution of the name issue in a mutually acceptable manner is a fundamental necessity if further steps are to be taken on the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's* EU accession course.

The *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* applied to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague against Greece, alleging that Greece violated the Interim Accord by blocking the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's* accession to NATO in 2008.

In reality, however, Greece supports rather than opposes the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's* European and Euroatlantic perspective. It was also with Greece's consent that the visa requirement for citizens of the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* was abolished. But the basic objective prerequisite for the continuation and completion of the European and Euroatlantic courses of every candidate country is adoption of and respect in practice for the fundamental principles of the organization they want to join, and particularly the principle of good neighbourly relations, which is the basis for a partnership or alliance between states.

Instead of acknowledging and appreciating Greece's support for its European and Euroatlantic course, the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* usually answers Greece's gestures of support with fresh provocations and a hardened stance.

A compound name with a geographical qualifier for use in relations to everyone (erga omnes) is the best possible basis for finding an honest, mutually beneficial compromise that will not create winners and losers, but will lay the foundations for the development of a healthy and stable bilateral relationship based on the principle of respect for good neighbourly relations, and will strengthen peace and stability in the wider region.

Greece desires and is pursuing the mutually acceptable, clear and definitive resolution of the name issue – through a solution that will not create tensions in the future – at the soonest possible time.

The Greek government is making every effort in this direction, and proof of this is the repeated meetings that have been held, on Greece's initiative, at the highest political level.

Despite the existence of this serious issue, which impacts the relations between the two countries, Greece continues to have a prominent economic presence in the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, contributing substantially and significantly to development, job creation, infrastructure building, etc., in our neighbouring country.

The resolution of the name issue will remove a major point of friction from the relations between the two countries and will allow for full realization of the great potential for cooperation between the two countries.

U.S. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius to U.S. Missions
(Washington, Dec.26, 1944)¹

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers

The following is for your information and general guidance, but not for any positive action at this time.

The Department has noted with considerable apprehension increasing propaganda rumors and semi-official statements in favor of an "autonomous Macedonia", emanating principally from Bulgaria, but also from Yugoslav Partisan and other sources, with the implication that Greek territory would be included in the projected state.

This Government considers talk of "Macedonian nation", "Macedonia Fatherland", or "Macedonian national consciousness" to be unjustified demagoguery representing no ethnic or political reality, and sees in its present revival a possible cloak for aggressive intentions against Greece.

The approved policy of this Government is to oppose any revival of the Macedonian issue as related to Greece. The Greek section of Macedonia is largely inhabited by Greeks, and the Greek people are almost unanimously opposed to the creation of a "Macedonian state." Allegations of serious Greek participation in any such agitation can be assumed to be false. This Government would regard as responsible any Government or Group of Governments tolerating or encouraging menacing or aggressive acts of "Macedonian forces" against Greece. The Department would appreciate any information pertinent to this subject which may come to your attention.
Stettinius

¹ Source: U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations vol.vii, Washington, D.C. Circular Airgram (868.014/26 Dec.1944).



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/817 (1993)
7 April 1993

RESOLUTION 817 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3196th meeting,
on 7 April 1993

The Security Council,

Having examined the application for admission to the United Nations in document S/25147,

Noting that the applicant fulfils the criteria for membership in the United Nations laid down in Article 4 of the Charter,

Noting however that a difference has arisen over the name of the State, which needs to be resolved in the interest of the maintenance of peaceful and good-neighbourly relations in the region,

Welcoming the readiness of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, at the request of the Secretary-General, to use their good offices to settle the above-mentioned difference, and to promote confidence-building measures among the parties,

Taking note of the contents of the letters contained in documents S/25541, S/25542 and S/25543 received from the parties,

1. Urges the parties to continue to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in order to arrive at a speedy settlement of their difference;
2. Recommends to the General Assembly that the State whose application is contained in document S/25147 be admitted to membership in the United Nations, this State being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the outcome of the initiative taken by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/845 (1993)
18 June 1993

RESOLUTION 845 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3243rd meeting,
on 18 June 1993

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 817 (1993) of 7 April 1993, in which it urged Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in order to arrive at a speedy settlement of their difference,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to resolution 817 (1993), together with the statement of the Government of Greece and the letter of the President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia dated 27 and 29 May 1993 respectively (S/25855 and Add.1 and 2),

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia for their efforts and commends to the parties as a sound basis for the settlement of their difference the proposals set forth in annex V to the report of the Secretary-General;
2. Urges the parties to continue their efforts under the auspices of the Secretary-General to arrive at a speedy settlement of the remaining issues between them;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on the progress of these further efforts, the objective of which is to resolve the difference between the two parties before the commencement of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, and to report to the Council on their outcome in good time, and decides to resume consideration of the matter in the light of the report.

180693

United Nations

A/RES/47/225



General Assembly

Distr. GENERAL

8 April 1993

ORIGINAL:
ENGLISH

A/RES/47/225
98th plenary meeting
8 April 1993

Admission of the State whose application is contained in document A/47/876-S/25147 to membership in the United Nations

The General Assembly,

Having received the recommendation of the Security Council of 7 April 1993 that the State whose application is contained in document A/47/876-S/25147 should be admitted to membership in the United Nations,

Having considered the application for membership contained in document A/47/876-S/25147,

Decides to admit the State whose application is contained in document A/47/876-S/25147 to membership in the United Nations, this State being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State.

No. 32193

**GREECE
and
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC
OF MACEDONIA**

**Interim Accord (with related letters and translations of the
Interim Accord in the languages of the Contracting Parties).
Signed at New York on 13 September 1995**

Authentic text: English.

Registered by Greece on 13 October 1995.

**GRÈCE
et
L'EX-RÉPUBLIQUE YOUGOSLAVE
DE MACÉDOINE**

**Accord intérimaire (avec lettres connexes et traductions de
l'Accord intérimaire dans les langues des Parties contractantes).
Signé à New York le 13 septembre 1995**

Texte authentique : anglais.

Enregistré par la Grèce le 13 octobre 1995.

INTERIM ACCORD¹

Minister Karolos Papoulias, representing the Party of the First Part (the "Party of the First Part") and Minister Stevo Crvenkovski, representing the Party of the Second Part (the "Party of the Second Part"), hereby DECLARE AND AGREE as follows:

Recalling the principles of the inviolability of frontiers and the territorial integrity of States incorporated in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki,²

Bearing in mind the provisions of the United Nations Charter and, in particular, those referring to the obligation of States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,

Guided by the spirit and principles of democracy and fundamental freedoms and respect for human rights and dignity, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a new Europe³ and pertinent acts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Considering their mutual interest in the maintenance of international peace and security, especially in their region,

Desiring to confirm the existing frontier between them as an enduring international border,

Recalling their obligation not to intervene, on any pretext or in any form, in the internal affairs of the other,

Desiring to develop their mutual relations and to lay firm foundations for a climate of peaceful relations and understanding,

Realizing that economic cooperation is an important element for the development of mutual relations on a stable and firm basis, as well as desiring to develop and promote future cooperation,

Desiring to reach certain interim agreements that will provide a basis for negotiating a permanent Accord.

Have agreed as follows:

¹ Came into force on 13 October 1995, i.e., the thirtieth day following the date of signature, in accordance with article 23 (1).

² *International Legal Materials*, vol. XIV (1975), p. 1292 (American Society of International Law).

³ United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fifth Session*, document A/45/859.

A. FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

Article 1

1. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the First Part recognizes the Party of the Second Part as an independent and sovereign state, under the provisional designation set forth in a letter of the Party of the First Part of the date of this Interim Accord, and the Parties shall at an early date establish diplomatic relations at an agreed level with the ultimate goal of relations at ambassadorial level.

2. The Party of the First Part shall as promptly as possible establish a liaison office in Skopje, the capital of the Party of the Second Part, and the Party of the Second Part shall as promptly as possible establish a liaison office in Athens, the capital of the Party of the First Part.

Article 2

The Parties hereby confirm their common existing frontier as an enduring and inviolable international border.

Article 3

Each Party undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the political independence of the other Party. Neither Party shall support the action of a third party directed against the sovereignty, the territorial integrity or the political independence of the other Party.

Article 4

The Parties shall refrain, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or use of force, including the threat or use of force designed to violate their existing frontier, and they agree that neither of them will assert or support claims to any part of the territory of the other Party or claims for a change of their existing frontier.

Article 5

1. The Parties agree to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Security Council resolution 845 (1993)¹ with a view to reaching agreement on the difference described in that resolution and in Security Council resolution 817 (1993).²

2. Recognizing the difference between them with respect to the name of the Party of the Second Part, each Party reserves all of its rights consistent with the specific obligations undertaken in this Interim Accord. The Parties shall cooperate with a view to

¹ United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-eighth Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1993 (S/INF/49)*, p. 33.

² *Ibid.*, p. 132.

facilitating their mutual relations notwithstanding their respective positions as to the name of the Party of the Second Part. In this context, the Parties shall take practical measures, including dealing with the matter of documents, to carry out normal trade and commerce between them in a manner consistent with their respective positions in regard to the name of the Party of the Second Part. The Parties shall take practical measures so that the difference about the name of the Party of the Second Part will not obstruct or interfere with normal trade and commerce between the Party of the Second Part and third parties.

Article 6

1. The Party of the Second Part hereby solemnly declares that nothing in its Constitution, and in particular in the Preamble thereto or in Article 3 of the Constitution, can or should be interpreted as constituting or will ever constitute the basis of any claim by the Party of the Second Part to any territory not within its existing borders.

2. The Party of the Second Part hereby solemnly declares that nothing in its Constitution, and in particular in Article 49 as amended, can or should be interpreted as constituting or will ever constitute the basis for the Party of the Second Part to interfere in the internal affairs of another State in order to protect the status and rights of any persons in other States who are not citizens of the Party of the Second Part.

3. The Party of the Second Part furthermore solemnly declares that the interpretations given in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article will not be superseded by any other interpretation of its Constitution.

Article 7

1. Each Party shall promptly take effective measures to prohibit hostile activities or propaganda by State-controlled agencies and to discourage acts by private entities likely to incite violence, hatred or hostility against each other.

2. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the Second Part shall cease to use in any way the symbol in all its forms displayed on its national flag prior to such entry into force.

3. If either Party believes one or more symbols constituting part of its historic or cultural patrimony is being used by the other Party, it shall bring such alleged use to the attention of the other Party, and the other Party shall take appropriate corrective action or indicate why it does not consider it necessary to do so.

Article 8

1. The Parties shall refrain from imposing any impediment to the movement of people or goods between their territories or through the territory of either Party to the territory of the other. Both Parties shall cooperate to facilitate such movements in accordance with international law and custom.

2. The Parties agree that the European Union and the United States may be requested to use their good offices with respect to developing practical measures referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 5 so as to assist the Parties in the implementation of Article 8.

B. HUMAN AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

Article 9

1. In the conduct of their affairs the Parties shall be guided by the spirit and principles of democracy, fundamental freedoms, respect for human rights and dignity, and the rule of law, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,¹ the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,² the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,³ the Convention on the Rights of the Child,⁴ the Helsinki Final Act,⁴ the document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe.

2. No provision of the instruments listed in paragraph 1 above shall be interpreted to give any right to take any action contrary to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter, or of the Helsinki Final Act, including the principle of the territorial integrity of States.

Article 10

Convinced that the development of human relations is necessary for improving understanding and good-neighborliness of their two peoples, the Parties shall encourage contacts at all appropriate levels and shall not discourage meetings between their citizens in accordance with international law and custom.

C. INTERNATIONAL, MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Article 11

1. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the First Part agrees not to object to the application by or the membership of the Party of the Second Part in international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a member; however, the Party of the First Part reserves the right to object to any membership referred to above if and to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be referred to in such organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993).

¹ United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part I*, p. 71.

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 213, p. 221.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 660, p. 195.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 1577, No. I-27531.

2. The Parties agree that the ongoing economic development of the Party of the Second Part should be supported through international cooperation, as far as possible by a close relationship of the Party of the Second Part with the European Economic Area and the European Union.

D. TREATY RELATIONS

Article 12

1. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Parties shall in their relations be directed by the provisions of the following bilateral agreements that had been concluded between the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Party of the First Part on 18 June 1959:

- (a) The convention concerning mutual legal relations,¹
- (b) The agreement concerning the reciprocal recognition and the enforcement of judicial decisions,² and
- (c) The agreement concerning hydro-economic questions.³

The Parties shall promptly consult with a view to entering into new agreements substantially similar to those referred to above.

2. The Parties shall consult with each other in order to identify other agreements concluded between the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Party of the First Part that will be deemed suitable for application in their mutual relations.

3. The Parties may conclude additional bilateral agreements in areas of mutual interest.

Article 13

Having regard to the fact that the Party of the Second Part is a land-locked State, the Parties shall be guided by the applicable provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea⁴ as far as practicable both in practice and when concluding agreements referred to in Article 12.

Article 14

1. The Parties shall encourage the development of friendly and good-neighborly relations between them and shall reinforce their economic cooperation in all sectors, including that of water resources management. In particular they shall promote, on a

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 368, p. 81.

² *Ibid.*, p. 69.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 363, p. 133.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vols. 1833, 1834 and 1835, No. I-31363.

reciprocal basis, road, rail, maritime and air transport and communication links, using the best available technologies, and facilitate the transit of their goods between them and through their territories and ports. The Parties shall observe international rules and regulations with respect to transit, telecommunications, signs and codes.

2. To this end the Parties agree to enter forthwith into negotiations aimed at promptly implementing agreements of cooperation in the aforementioned areas, taking into account the obligations of the Party of the First Part deriving from its membership in the European Union and from other international instruments. Such agreements shall relate to visas, work permits, "green-card" insurance, air space transit and economic cooperation.

E. ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LEGAL RELATIONS

Article 15

1. The Parties shall strengthen their economic relations in all fields.
2. The Parties shall in particular support development and cooperation in the field of capital investments, as well as industrial cooperation between enterprises. Special attention shall be paid to cooperation between small and medium-size companies and enterprises.

Article 16

1. The Parties shall develop and improve scientific and technical cooperation, as well as cooperation in the field of education.
2. The Parties shall intensify their exchanges of information and of scientific and technical documentation, and shall strive to improve mutual access to scientific and research institutions, archives, libraries and similar institutions.
3. The Parties shall support initiatives by scientific institutions and by individuals aimed at improving cooperation in the sciences.

Article 17

1. The Parties shall take great care to avoid dangers to the environment and to preserve natural living conditions in the lakes and rivers shared by the two Parties.
2. The Parties shall cooperate in eliminating all forms of pollution in border areas.
3. The Parties shall strive to develop and harmonize strategies and programs for regional and international cooperation for protecting the environment.

Article 18

The Parties shall cooperate in alleviating the consequences of disasters.

Article 19

1. The Parties shall cooperate in improving and promoting business and tourist travel.

2. Consistent with the obligations of the Party of the First Part arising from its membership in the European Union and from relevant instruments of the Union, the Parties shall make joint efforts to improve and accelerate customs and border formalities, including simplification in the issuance of visas to each other's citizens, taking into account Article 5, paragraph 2, of this Interim Accord.

3. The Parties shall endeavor to improve and modernize existing border crossings as required by the flow of traffic, and construct new border crossings as necessary.

Article 20

The Parties shall cooperate in the fight against organized crime, terrorism, economic crimes, narcotics crimes, illegal trade in cultural property, offenses against civil air transport and counterfeiting.

F. FINAL CLAUSES

Article 21

1. The Parties shall settle any disputes exclusively by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Any difference or dispute that arises between the Parties concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Interim Accord may be submitted by either of them to the International Court of Justice, except for the difference referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1.

Article 22


This Interim Accord is not directed against any other State or entity and it does not infringe on the rights and duties resulting from bilateral and multilateral agreements already in force that the Parties have concluded with other States or international organizations.


Article 23

1. This Interim Accord shall enter into force and become effective on the thirtieth day following the date on which it is signed by the representatives of the Parties as set forth below.


2. This Interim Accord shall remain in force until superseded by a definitive agreement, provided that after seven years either Party may withdraw from this Interim Accord by a written notice, which shall take effect 12 months after its delivery to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Parties have, through their authorized representatives, signed three copies of this Interim Accord in the English language which shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. Within two months of the date of signature, the United Nations is to prepare, in consultation with the Parties, translations into the language of the Party of the First Part and the language of the Party of the Second Part, which shall constitute part of the registration of this Accord.

¹
Representative of the
Party of the First Part

²
Representative of the
Party of the Second Part

WITNESSED, in accordance with Resolution 845 (1993) of the Security Council, by:


Cyrus Vance
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations

DONE at New York on the 13th day of September 1995

¹ Karolos Papoulias.
² Stevo Crvenkovski.

RELATED LETTERS

THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS


13 September 1995

Dear Mr. Vance:

In implementation of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord of today's date the Government of Greece recognizes the Party of the Second Part within its internationally recognized borders with the provisional name of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Very truly yours,



KAROLOS PAPOULIAS
Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations
The United Nations
New York City

UNITED NATIONS


NATIONS UNIES

13 September 1995

Dear Minister Crvenkovski:

I enclose herewith a copy of a letter addressed to me today by Minister Papoulias concerning the implementation of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord of today's date.

Very truly yours,



CYRUS R. VANCE
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations

His Excellency Stevo Crvenkovski
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Skopje

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF MACEDONIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

13 September 1995

Dear Mr. Vance:

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of your letter of today's date, under cover of which you transmitted to me a copy of a letter addressed to you today by Minister Papoulias concerning the implementation of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord of today's date.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Very truly yours,



STEVO CRVENKOVSKI
Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations
The United Nations
New York City

THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS


13 September 1995

Dear Mr. Vance:

With regard to Article 7, paragraph 2 of the Interim Accord of today's date the Government of Greece would like to confirm that the symbol referred to in the above-mentioned Article of the said Accord is the Sun or Star of Vergina, in all its historical forms.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Very truly yours,



KAROLOS PAPOULIAS
Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations
The United Nations
New York City

UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES


13 September 1995

Dear Minister Papoulias:

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of your letter of today's date concerning Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Interim Accord of today's date. I have made the other Party aware of the content of your letter.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Very truly yours,



CYRUS R. VANCE
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations

His Excellency Karolos Papoulias
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Athens

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF MACEDONIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK


13 September 1995

Dear Mr. Vance:

This is to inform you that in connection with the Interim Accord of today's date, my Government wishes to make clear that no instrument that has not been signed on its behalf can be considered as binding on it.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Very truly yours,



STEVO CRVENKOVSKI
Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations
The United Nations
New York City

UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES


13 September 1995

Dear Minister Crvenkovski:

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of your letter of today's date concerning the legal effect of the instruments exchanged in connection with the Interim Accord of today's date. I have made the other party aware of the content of your letter.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Very truly yours,



CYRUS R. VANCE
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations

His Excellency Stevo Crvenkovski
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Skopje

Bucharest Summit Declaration

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, met today to enlarge our Alliance and further strengthen our ability to confront the existing and emerging 21st century security threats. We reviewed the significant progress we have made in recent years to transform NATO, agreeing that this is a process that must continue. Recognising the enduring value of the transatlantic link and of NATO as the essential forum for security consultations between Europe and North America, we reaffirmed our solidarity and cohesion and our commitment to the common vision and shared democratic values embodied in the Washington Treaty. The principle of the indivisibility of Allied security is fundamental. A strong collective defence of our populations, territory and forces is the core purpose of our Alliance and remains our most important security task. We reiterate our faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.
2. Today, we have decided to invite Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks to join our Alliance. We congratulate these countries on this historic achievement, earned through years of hard work and a demonstrated commitment to our common security and NATO's shared values. The accession of these new members will strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, and bring us closer to our goal of a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.
3. We look forward to the 60th Anniversary Summit in 2009, which will underscore the enduring importance of the transatlantic link. We continue to transform our Alliance with new members; better responses to security challenges, taking into account lessons learned; more deployable capabilities; and new relationships with our partners. The Summit will provide an opportunity to further articulate and strengthen the Alliance's vision of its role in meeting the evolving challenges of the 21st century and maintaining the ability to perform the full range of its missions, collectively defending our security at home and contributing to stability abroad. Accordingly, we request the Council in Permanent Session to prepare a Declaration on Alliance Security for adoption at the Summit to further set the scene for this important task.
4. We have welcomed to Bucharest a number of our partner nations; Mr. Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General of the United Nations; and prominent representatives of other international organisations. Many of today's security challenges cannot be successfully met by NATO acting alone. Meeting them can best be achieved through a broad partnership with the wider international community, as part of a truly comprehensive approach, based on a shared sense of openness and cooperation as well as determination on all sides. We are resolved to promote peace and stability, and to meet the global challenges that increasingly affect the security of all of us, by working together.

5. The success of this common effort depends greatly on individual commitment. We pay tribute to the professionalism and bravery of the more than sixty thousand men and women from Allied and other nations who are involved in NATO's missions and operations. We extend our deepest sympathies to the families and loved ones of those who have died or been injured during the course of their duties. Their sacrifices will not be in vain.
6. Euro-Atlantic and wider international security is closely tied to Afghanistan's future as a peaceful, democratic state, respectful of human rights and free from the threat of terrorism. For that reason, our UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, currently comprising 40 nations, is our top priority. Working with the Afghans, we have made significant progress, but we recognise that remaining challenges demand additional efforts. Neither we nor our Afghan partners will allow extremists and terrorists to regain control of Afghanistan or use it as a base for terror that threatens all of our people. With our ISAF partners, and with the engagement of President Karzai, we will issue a statement on Afghanistan. This statement sets out a clear vision guided by four principles: a firm and shared long-term commitment; support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility; a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts; and increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan's neighbours, especially Pakistan. We welcome announcements by Allies and partners of new force contributions and other forms of support as further demonstration of our resolve; and we look forward to additional contributions. We welcome as well the appointment of Ambassador Kai Eide, the United Nations' Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), who will provide added impetus and coherence to the international community's efforts. We welcome the upcoming Paris Conference that will review progress on and strengthen international efforts to further implement the Afghanistan Compact.
7. Our commitment to regional security and stability throughout the Balkans remains steadfast. We praise the prompt, impartial and effective performance by KFOR in the face of violence, and we deplore all attacks against the UN-mandated NATO-led KFOR and other international presences in Kosovo. We reiterate that KFOR will remain in Kosovo on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 to ensure a safe and secure environment, including freedom of movement, for all people in Kosovo unless the Security Council decides otherwise.
8. In Kosovo, NATO and KFOR will continue to work with the authorities and, bearing in mind its operational mandate, KFOR will cooperate with and assist the United Nations, the European Union and other international actors, as appropriate, to support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo. We support UN action to ensure respect for the rule of law and call on all parties to take affirmative steps to prevent and condemn violence in Kosovo. NATO and KFOR welcome the restraint shown thus far by the authorities in Kosovo. We expect continued full implementation of their commitments to standards, especially those related to the rule of law and regarding the protection of ethnic minorities and communities, as well as the protection of historical and religious sites, and to combating crime and corruption.

9. NATO stands ready to play its part in the implementation of future security arrangements. Recalling UNSCR 1244, we note the necessity of maintaining international presences throughout Kosovo, whose efforts contribute to freedom of movement and the flow of people and goods, including border monitoring. We call on all actors of the region to engage constructively and to avoid any actions or rhetoric that could undermine the security situation in Kosovo or in any other part of the region. KFOR will continue close security dialogue with all parties.
10. Today's information environment, in particular with regard to our operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, underlines the need for appropriate, timely, accurate and responsive communication with local and international audiences in relation to NATO's policies and engagement in international operations. We welcome the progress made in enhancing NATO's strategic communications capability, as demonstrated by the rapid response Media Operations Centre. We also welcome the launching at our Summit of a new NATO TV channel on the internet which will include regular news updates and video reports, in particular from the various regions of Afghanistan. We underscore our commitment to support further improvement of our strategic communications by the time of our 2009 Summit.
11. Experiences in Afghanistan and the Balkans demonstrate that the international community needs to work more closely together and take a comprehensive approach to address successfully the security challenges of today and tomorrow. Effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires the cooperation and contribution of all major actors, including that of Non-Governmental Organisations and relevant local bodies. To this end, it is essential for all major international actors to act in a coordinated way, and to apply a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments in a concerted effort that takes into account their respective strengths and mandates. We have endorsed an Action Plan comprising a set of pragmatic proposals to develop and implement NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach. These proposals aim to improve the coherent application of NATO's own crisis management instruments and enhance practical cooperation at all levels with other actors, wherever appropriate, including provisions for support to stabilisation and reconstruction. They relate to areas such as planning and conduct of operations; training and education; and enhancing cooperation with external actors. We task the Council in Permanent Session to implement this Action Plan as a matter of priority and to keep it under continual review, taking into account all relevant developments as well as lessons learned.
12. We welcome over a decade of cooperation between the United Nations and NATO in support of the work of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security. We have developed operational cooperation in peacekeeping through the UN-mandated NATO-led operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. These shared experiences have demonstrated the value of effective and efficient coordination between the two organisations. Further cooperation will significantly contribute to addressing the threats and challenges to which the international community is called upon to respond. NATO reaffirms its faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations including the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the UN Charter, as stated in the Washington Treaty. The primary responsibility for the maintenance of

international peace and security rests with the United Nations Security Council.

13. NATO is also playing its role in contributing to the implementation by nations of UNSCR 1373 and related UNSCRs in the fight against terrorism, and is lending its support to non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction by playing its role in contributing to the implementation by nations of UNSCR 1540.
14. NATO-EU relations cover a wide range of issues of common interest relating to security, defence and crisis management, including the fight against terrorism, the development of coherent and mutually reinforcing military capabilities, and civil emergency planning. Our successful cooperation in the Western Balkans, including with EU operation Althea through the Berlin Plus arrangements, is contributing to peace and security in the region. In the light of shared common values and strategic interests, NATO and the EU are working side by side in key crisis management operations and will continue to do so. We recognise the value that a stronger and more capable European defence brings, providing capabilities to address the common challenges both NATO and the EU face. We therefore support mutually reinforcing efforts to this end. Success in these and future cooperative endeavours calls for enhanced commitment to ensure effective methods of working together. We are therefore determined to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership as agreed by our two organisations, to achieve closer cooperation and greater efficiency, and to avoid unnecessary duplication in a spirit of transparency, and respecting the autonomy of the two organisations. A stronger EU will further contribute to our common security.
15. We condemn in the strongest terms all acts of terrorism, whatever their motivation or manifestation. Our nations remain determined to fight this scourge, individually and collectively, as long as necessary and in accordance with international law and UN principles. Terrorists are using a variety of conventional weapons and tactics, including asymmetric tactics, and may seek to use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to threaten international peace and security. We attach great importance to the protection of our populations, territories, infrastructure and forces against the consequences of terrorist attacks. We will continue to develop and contribute to policies to prevent and counter proliferation, with a view to preventing terrorist access to, and use of, WMD. We will also continue to support our programme of work to develop advanced capabilities to help defend against terrorist attacks, including through the continuing development of new technologies. We remain committed to strengthening the Alliance's ability to share information and intelligence on terrorism, especially in support of NATO operations. Our Alliance provides an essential transatlantic dimension to the response against terrorism and our nations will continue to contribute to the full implementation of UNSCR 1373 and related UNSCRs, in particular UNSCR 1540, and to the wider efforts of the international community in this regard. Dialogue and cooperation with other international organisations, as appropriate, and with our partners are essential, and we welcome efforts towards revitalising the implementation of the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism. We reiterate our commitment to Operation Active Endeavour, our maritime operation in the Mediterranean, which continues to make a significant contribution to the fight against terrorism.

16. We remain deeply concerned by the continued violence and atrocities in Darfur and call on all parties to cease hostilities. NATO remains ready, following consultation with and the agreement of the United Nations and the African Union (AU), to support their peacekeeping efforts in the region. At the request of the African Union, NATO has agreed to provide support to the AU Mission in Somalia and we are prepared to consider further requests for support to this mission. As an example of our comprehensive approach, we welcome the direct cooperation between NATO and the AU, demonstrated through our recently concluded support to the AU Mission in Sudan and our ongoing support to the African Standby Force. NATO welcomes the European Union's EUFOR Chad / Central African Republic operation and the EU's contribution to stability and security in the region.
17. We reiterate the Alliance's commitment to support the Government and people of Iraq and to assist with the development of Iraqi Security Forces. We have responded positively to a request by Prime Minister Al-Maliki to extend the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) through 2009. We are also favourably considering the Government of Iraq's request to enhance the NTM-I mission in areas such as Navy and Air Force leadership training, police training, border security, the fight against terrorism, defence reform, defence institution building, and Small Arms and Light Weapons accountability. NTM-I continues to make an important contribution to international efforts to train and equip Iraqi Security Forces and, to date, has trained over 10,000 members of these forces. Complementing these efforts, NATO has also approved proposals for a structured cooperation framework to develop NATO's long-term relationship with Iraq and continue to develop Iraq's capabilities to address common challenges and threats.
18. NATO's ongoing enlargement process has been an historic success in advancing stability and cooperation and bringing us closer to our common goal of a Europe whole and free, united in peace, democracy and common values. NATO's door will remain open to European democracies willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. We reiterate that decisions on enlargement are for NATO itself to make.
19. Our invitation to Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks to join our Alliance marks the beginning of a new chapter for the Western Balkans and shows the way forward to a future in which a stable region is fully integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions and able to make a major contribution to international security.
20. **We recognise the hard work and the commitment demonstrated by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ to NATO values and Alliance operations. We commend them for their efforts to build a multi-ethnic society. Within the framework of the UN, many actors have worked hard to resolve the name issue, but the Alliance has noted with regret that these talks have not produced a successful outcome. Therefore we agreed that an invitation to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached. We encourage the negotiations to be resumed without delay and expect them to be concluded as soon as possible.**
21. Admitting Albania and Croatia will enhance the Alliance's ability to face the challenges of today and tomorrow. These countries have demonstrated a solid

- commitment to the basic principles set out in the Washington Treaty as well as their ability, and readiness, to protect freedom and our shared values by contributing to the Alliance's collective defence and full range of missions.
22. We will begin talks immediately with the aim of signing Accession Protocols by the end of July 2008 and completing the ratification process without delay. During the period leading up to accession, NATO will involve the invited countries in Alliance activities to the greatest extent possible, and will continue to provide support and assistance, including through the Membership Action Plan (MAP). We look forward to receiving the invited countries' timetables for reform, upon which further progress will be expected before, and after, accession in order to enhance their contribution to the Alliance.
 23. NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries' applications for MAP. Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications. We have asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting. Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.
 24. We remain committed to the strategically important region of the Balkans, where Euro-Atlantic integration, based on democratic values and regional cooperation, remains necessary for lasting peace and stability. We welcome progress since the Riga Summit in developing our cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. We encourage each of these three countries to use to the fullest extent possible the opportunities for dialogue, reform and cooperation offered by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, and we have directed the Council in Permanent Session to keep the development of relations with each of these Partners under review..
 25. We welcome Bosnia and Herzegovina's and Montenegro's decisions to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO. We look forward to ambitious and substantive Action Plans which will further the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of these countries and we pledge our assistance to their respective reform efforts towards this goal. To help foster and guide these efforts, we have decided to invite Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro to begin an Intensified Dialogue on the full range of political, military, financial, and security issues relating to their aspirations to membership, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision.
 26. We stand ready to further develop an ambitious and substantive relationship with Serbia, making full use of its Partnership for Peace membership, and with a view to making more progress towards Serbia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. We reiterate our willingness to deepen our cooperation with Serbia, in particular through developing an IPAP, and we will consider an Intensified Dialogue following a request by Serbia.

27. We expect Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and will closely monitor their respective efforts in this regard.
28. We recall that the NATO-Russia partnership was conceived as a strategic element in fostering security in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on core principles, values and commitments, including democracy, civil liberties and political pluralism. Looking back at a history of more than a decade, we have developed a political dialogue as well as concrete projects in a broad range of international security issues where we have common goals and interests. While we are concerned by recent Russian statements and actions on key security issues of mutual concern, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), we stand ready to continue working with Russia as equal partners in areas of common concern, as envisaged by the Rome Declaration and the Founding Act. We should continue our common efforts in the fight against terrorism and in the area of non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. We urge Russia to engage actively in important cooperative offers that have been extended. We believe that United States-Russia bilateral discussions on missile defence and CFE, among other issues, can make an important contribution in this field. We believe the potential of the NATO-Russia Council is not fully realised and we remain ready to identify and pursue opportunities for joint actions at 27, while recalling the principle of independence of decision-making and actions by NATO or Russia. We reaffirm to Russia that NATO's Open Door policy and current, as well as any future, NATO Missile Defence efforts are intended to better address the security challenges we all face, and reiterate that, far from posing a threat to our relationship, they offer opportunities to deepen levels of cooperation and stability.
29. We note Russia's ratification of the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement, and hope that it will facilitate further practical cooperation. We appreciate Russia's readiness to support NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan by facilitating transit through Russian territory. We would welcome deepened NATO-Russia cooperation in support of, and agreed by, the Government of Afghanistan, and look forward to building on the solid work already achieved in training Afghan and Central Asian counter-narcotics officers. Our continued cooperation under our Cooperative Airspace Initiative and Russia's support to Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean contribute to our common fight against terrorism. We also welcome our cooperation on military interoperability, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, and civil emergency planning.
30. We reaffirm that NATO's policy of outreach through partnerships, dialogue, and cooperation is an essential part of the Alliance's purpose and tasks. The Alliance's partnerships across the globe have an enduring value, contributing to stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. With this in mind, we welcome progress made since our last Summit in Riga in strengthening NATO's policy of partnerships and cooperation, and reaffirm our commitment to undertake further efforts in this regard.
31. We value highly the contributions that our partners are making to NATO's missions and operations. Seventeen nations outside the Alliance are contributing forces to our operations and missions and many others provide different forms of support. We will continue to strive to promote greater

interoperability between our forces and those of partner nations; to further enhance information-sharing and consultations with nations contributing to NATO-led operations; and to offer partner countries NATO's advice on, and assistance with, the defence- and security-related aspects of reform.

32. We welcome our Euro-Atlantic Partners at the Bucharest Summit and reiterate the enduring value of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. We remain committed to substantive political discussions and effective cooperation within these frameworks. We welcome Malta's return to the PfP and look forward to its active engagement in the EAPC. We welcome the strengthening of political dialogue through the EAPC Security Forum. We will give priority to several new practical initiatives, which include building integrity in defence institutions and the important role of women in conflict resolution as outlined in UNSCR 1325. We value the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre's successes over the past ten years in coordinating NATO and partner countries' contributions to disaster relief. We will continue to make full use of the NATO/PfP Trust Funds and of their opening to other partner countries. We welcome and will continue to support the engagement of all interested Partners across the Euro-Atlantic area in programmes to support defence and broader reforms, including the Individual Partnership Action Plan. Recalling our Istanbul Summit decision, we are committed to engage our Partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia, including by strengthening liaison arrangements in these regions, and will continue dialogue with our Central Asian Partners on Afghanistan. We appreciate the significant contributions provided by our EAPC Partners to Alliance operations and look forward to working with them to address the security challenges of the 21st century.
33. We are pleased to note the significant progress achieved in the framework of our Mediterranean Dialogue since the Istanbul and Riga Summits. Political consultations with our Mediterranean Dialogue partners have gained both in frequency and substance, and the meeting held between our Foreign Ministers and their seven Mediterranean Dialogue partners last December contributed to a further deepening of our partnership. We therefore plan to pursue this momentum through deepening our liaison arrangements, on a voluntary basis, with the region. Our practical cooperation has grown in several areas, and new opportunities have been created especially in training and education. We welcome the progress made in the implementation activities of the NATO Training Cooperation Initiative, in the spirit of joint ownership and in the view of launching the NATO Regional Cooperation Course at the NATO Defense College, where two pilot courses were successfully conducted. We encourage our Mediterranean Dialogue partners to work with us to develop this Initiative further. The conclusion of Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP) with Egypt and Israel will help in establishing long-term, structured and effective cooperation with those countries. We encourage our other Mediterranean Dialogue partners to develop their own ICP in the near future. We welcome the implementation of the first ever Mediterranean Dialogue Trust Fund project to assist Jordan with the disposal of unexploded ordnance and ammunitions, and the launching of the feasibility study for the Trust Fund project to assist Mauritania with the disposal of ammunitions. We thank our

Mediterranean Dialogue partners for their various contributions to our operations and missions.

34. We welcome the response of four countries in the Gulf region to our offer of cooperation in the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and encourage other countries of the region to take up that offer. To that end, we plan to develop our liaison arrangements, on a voluntary basis, with this region. We are pleased to see their increased interest and participation in NATO training and education activities, and stand ready to enhance our cooperation in this and other fields. We welcome the progress made in the implementation activities of the NATO Training Cooperation Initiative, in the spirit of joint ownership and in the view of launching the NATO Regional Cooperation Course at the NATO Defense College, where two pilot courses were successfully conducted. We encourage our ICI partners to work with us to develop this Initiative further. We encourage our ICI partners to develop an ICP with a view to better structuring our cooperation. We very much appreciate the support provided by our ICI partners to Alliance operations and missions.
35. The Alliance places a high value on its expanding and varied relationships with other partners across the globe. Our objectives in these relationships include support for operations, security cooperation, and enhanced common understanding to advance shared security interests and democratic values. We have made substantial progress in building political dialogue and developing individual Tailored Cooperation Packages with a number of these countries. We particularly welcome the significant contribution by Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore to NATO-led efforts in Afghanistan. We also welcome the valuable contributions by the Republic of Korea to efforts which support the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. Recognising that each of these countries wishes to pursue a unique degree of relations with NATO, and that other countries may wish to pursue dialogue and cooperation with NATO as well, we reiterate our willingness to further develop existing, and openness to new, individual relationships, subject to the approval of the North Atlantic Council, and at a pace that respects mutual interests in so doing.
36. We reaffirm the continued importance of the Black Sea region for Euro-Atlantic security. In this regard, we welcome the progress in consolidation of regional ownership, through effective use of existing initiatives and mechanisms. The Alliance will continue to support, as appropriate, these efforts guided by regional priorities and based on transparency, complementarity and inclusiveness, in order to develop dialogue and cooperation among the Black Sea states and with the Alliance.
37. Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory and populations. Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat. We therefore recognise the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets. We are exploring ways to link this capability with current NATO missile defence efforts as a way to ensure that it would be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture. Bearing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity, we task the Council in Permanent Session to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and

populations not otherwise covered by the United States system for review at our 2009 Summit, to inform any future political decision.

38. We also commend the work already underway to strengthen NATO-Russia missile defence cooperation. We are committed to maximum transparency and reciprocal confidence building measures to allay any concerns. We encourage the Russian Federation to take advantage of United States missile defence cooperation proposals and we are ready to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time.
39. We reaffirm that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to make an important contribution to peace, security, and stability and, in this regard, to preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. We took note of the report prepared for us on raising NATO's profile in this field. As part of a broader response to security issues, NATO should continue contributing to international efforts in the area of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, and we task the Council in Permanent Session to keep these issues under active review.
40. The Alliance has reduced both its conventional forces significantly from Cold War levels and has reduced nuclear weapons assigned to NATO by over 90%. Allies have also reduced their nuclear arsenals. France has reduced the types of its nuclear systems to two, the number of its nuclear delivery vehicles by over half, and has announced it will reduce the number of its nuclear warheads to fewer than 300, with no other weapons beside those in its operational stockpile. The United Kingdom has reduced to one nuclear system, and has reduced the explosive power of its nuclear stockpile by 75%, and its number of operationally available nuclear warheads to fewer than 160. The United States has reduced its nuclear weapon stockpile to less than 25% of its size at the height of the Cold War, and decreased tactical nuclear weapons assigned to NATO by nearly 90%.
41. We remain deeply concerned about the proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. We call on Iran to fully comply with UNSCRs 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803. We are also deeply concerned by the proliferation activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and call on it to fully comply with UNSCR 1718. Allies reaffirm their support for existing multi-lateral non-proliferation agreements, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and call for universal compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and universal adherence to the Additional Protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguard Agreement and full compliance with UNSCR 1540. Allies agree to redouble their efforts to fully implement the non-proliferation agreements and relevant UNSCRs to which Allies reaffirm their support and by which they are bound.
42. We fully endorse the statement of the North Atlantic Council of 28 March 2008 and reaffirm the Alliance's commitment to the CFE Treaty Regime, as expressed in the Alliance's position contained in paragraph 42 of the 2006 Riga Summit Declaration, the final statement by Allies at the CFE Extraordinary Conference in Vienna and Alliance statements reflecting subsequent developments. We place the highest value on the CFE Treaty regime with all its elements and underscore the strategic importance of the CFE Treaty, including its flank regime, as a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic Security. We are deeply concerned that the Russian Federation has continued

its unilateral “suspension” of its legal obligations under the CFE Treaty. This action does not contribute to our common objective of preserving the long-term viability of the CFE regime and we urge the Russian Federation to resume its implementation. The current situation, where NATO CFE Allies implement the Treaty while Russia does not, cannot last indefinitely. We have offered a set of constructive and forward-looking proposals for parallel actions on key issues, including steps by NATO Allies on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty and by the Russian Federation on outstanding commitments related to Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. We believe these proposals address all of Russia’s stated concerns. We encourage Russian authorities to work cooperatively with us and other concerned CFE States Parties to reach agreement on the basis of the parallel actions package so that together we can preserve the benefits of this landmark regime.

43. We are concerned with the persistence of regional conflicts in the South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova. Our nations support the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. We will continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts, taking into account these principles.
44. We have already done much to transform our forces and capabilities in line with our political objectives, in particular the priorities laid out in the Comprehensive Political Guidance, and our operational experience. We will continue this process to ensure the Alliance remains able to meet its operational commitments and perform the full range of its missions. Our operations highlight the need to develop and field modern, interoperable, flexible and sustainable forces. These forces must be able to conduct, upon decision by the Council, collective defence and crisis response operations on and beyond Alliance territory, on its periphery, and at strategic distance, with little or no host nation support. We will also ensure that we have the right kind of capabilities to meet the evolving security challenges of the 21st century, and to do so, we will transform, adapt and reform as necessary.
45. Transformation is a continual process and demands constant and active attention. We therefore support our Defence Ministers’ efforts as they oversee the management of the defence aspects of transformation to ensure NATO remains effective and efficient, especially by pursuing ongoing efforts in the following areas:
 - We must ensure that we provide the forces required for our operations and other commitments. To that end we will continue efforts to be able to deploy and sustain more forces. We are committed to support the NATO Response Force by providing the necessary forces, and to improving the availability of operational and strategic reserve forces for our operations. We will seek greater domestic support for our operations, including through improved public diplomacy efforts.
 - We will further develop the capabilities required to conduct the full range of our missions and to remedy specific shortfalls. We will work particularly at improving strategic lift and intra-theatre airlift, especially mission-capable helicopters and welcome national initiatives in support of this work, as well as addressing multinational logistics. We will further strengthen information superiority through networked capabilities, including an integrated air command and control system;

increased maritime situational awareness; and timely delivery of the Alliance Ground Surveillance capability. We will continue to enhance the capability and interoperability of our special operations forces. Supported by the defence planning processes, we will enhance our efforts to develop and field the right capabilities and forces, with the greatest practicable interoperability and standardisation. This will be furthered by improving trans-Atlantic defence industrial cooperation.

- We are committed to develop policies and capabilities to deal with emerging challenges and threats. This includes the development of a comprehensive policy for preventing the proliferation of WMD and defending against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.
 - We are pursuing the adaptation and reform of the Alliance's structures and processes. In this context we are reviewing the peacetime establishment of the NATO Command Structure to make it leaner, more effective and efficient, and reforming defence planning processes in order to promote timely delivery of the capabilities sought by the Comprehensive Political Guidance.
46. Transformation is not possible without sufficient, properly prioritised resources. We are committed to continuing to provide, individually and collectively, the resources necessary for our Alliance to perform the tasks we demand from it. Therefore we encourage nations whose defence spending is declining to halt that decline and to aim to increase defence spending in real terms.
47. NATO remains committed to strengthening key Alliance information systems against cyber attacks. We have recently adopted a Policy on Cyber Defence, and are developing the structures and authorities to carry it out. Our Policy on Cyber Defence emphasises the need for NATO and nations to protect key information systems in accordance with their respective responsibilities; share best practices; and provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack. We look forward to continuing the development of NATO's cyber defence capabilities and strengthening the linkages between NATO and national authorities.
48. We have noted a report "NATO's Role in Energy Security", prepared in response to the tasking of the Riga Summit. Allies have identified principles which will govern NATO's approach in this field, and outlined options and recommendations for further activities. Based on these principles, NATO will engage in the following fields: information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure. The Alliance will continue to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security. We will ensure that NATO's endeavours add value and are fully coordinated and embedded within those of the international community, which features a number of organisations that are specialised in energy security. We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to prepare a consolidated report on the progress achieved in the area of energy security for our consideration at the 2009 Summit.
49. Demands on our Alliance have grown in complexity in the last twenty years, as the security environment has changed and both the scope of our missions and operations and our membership have expanded. This requires continual

adaptation and reform of NATO Headquarters' structures and processes. We note the progress that has been made in this field, as part of NATO's overall transformation; but more remains to be done, including to get full benefit from our move to a new Headquarters building. In evaluating where we need to change, we need to make fuller use of lessons drawn from our experience in delivering our core functions, including meeting operational, capability development, partnership and strategic communications requirements. Building on our Defence Ministers' work to take forward the defence aspects of transformation, Allies will also need to consider how to achieve the fastest and most coherent flow of sound political, military and resource advice to support our consensual decision-making, and to enhance our responsiveness to time sensitive operational needs, including those of NATO Commanders. We have requested the Secretary General to chart a path forward, in time for the 2009 Summit, on how to meet these objectives.

50. We express our sincere appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of Romania. The city of Bucharest has been the venue of NATO's largest ever Summit meeting, highlighting the Alliance's determination to work closely with the International Community as well as its own unique contribution to promoting security and stability in a fast-changing strategic environment. At our meeting we have taken decisions and given further direction for NATO's own ongoing adaptation to that environment, through its missions and operations, the modernisation of its structures and capabilities, closer engagement of other nations and organisations, as well as its continuing openness to the inclusion of additional member states. We have strengthened our dialogue and cooperation with countries and organisations vital to our security. We will meet again next year in Strasbourg and Kehl to celebrate NATO's 60th anniversary, take stock of its adaptation, and give further direction for the modernisation of our Alliance to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.

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1. Turkey recognises the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.



**COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Brussels, 20 June 2008

11018/08

CONCL 2

COVER NOTE

from : Presidency
to : Delegations

Subject : **BRUSSELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL**
 19/20 JUNE 2008

PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS

Delegations will find attached the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (19/20 June 2008).

The meeting of the European Council was preceded by an exposé by Mr Hans-Gert Pötering, President of the European Parliament, followed by an exchange of views.

LISBON TREATY

1. The European Council took note of the preparatory work carried out in line with its December 2007 conclusions.
2. The European Council noted the outcome of the referendum in Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty and took stock of the situation on the basis of an initial assessment provided by the Taoiseach Brian Cowen.
3. The European Council agreed that more time was needed to analyse the situation. It noted that the Irish government will actively consult, both internally and with the other Member States, in order to suggest a common way forward.
4. Recalling that the purpose of the Lisbon Treaty is to help an enlarged Union to act more effectively and more democratically, the European Council noted that the parliaments in 19 Member States have ratified the Treaty and that the ratification process continues in other countries¹.
5. The European Council agreed to Ireland's suggestion to come back to this issue at its meeting of 15 October 2008 in order to consider the way forward. It underlined the importance in the meantime of continuing to deliver concrete results in the various policy areas of concern to the citizens.

¹ The European Council noted that the Czech Republic cannot complete their ratification process until the Constitutional Court delivers its positive opinion on the accordance of the Lisbon Treaty with the Czech constitutional order.

FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE

6. Strengthening the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice is a key priority for citizens. The European Council calls on the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission to make every effort to ensure the rapid adoption of important legislative proposals still pending in this field before the end of the year or, as appropriate, before the end of the current legislature.

7. Last December the European Council underlined the need for a renewed political commitment for the purpose of developing a comprehensive European migration policy. Since then, important progress has been achieved, in particular on the development of an integrated border management strategy and the enhancement of cooperation with third countries. Efforts in this area should be strengthened in the coming months, in order to increase the efficiency and coherence of migration policies. In this context the European Council welcomes the presentation by the Commission of its Communication "A common immigration policy for Europe: principles, actions and tools" and looks forward to the forthcoming proposal of a pact on immigration and asylum by the incoming French Presidency.

8. The European Council emphasises the interlinkages between migration, employment and development as well as the importance of combating the major pull factors of illegal migration. It calls on the Council to intensify work with a view to adopting the proposals on the admission of third country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment, on sanctions against employers of illegal immigrants, and on a single application procedure and a common set of rights for third country nationals.

9. The European Council welcomes the conclusions of the Council of April 2008 on practical cooperation in the field of asylum and the Commission Communication "Policy Plan on asylum, an integrated approach to protection across the EU". It underlines the need to continue with progress on the future Common European Asylum System with a view to its realisation by 2010.

10. The European Council underlines the importance of continuing work on the further development of the integrated border management strategy, including addressing particular pressures faced by some Member States and promoting a fair sharing of responsibilities. Rapid progress is needed on the future development of FRONTEX, including through the enhancement of operational coordination. Modern technologies must be harnessed to improve the management of external borders. The Commission is invited to present proposals for an entry/exit and registered traveller system by the beginning of 2010. The European Council looks forward to the forthcoming studies and possible legislative proposals on an electronic system for travel authorisation and on the creation of a European Border Surveillance System. The European Council invites the Commission to step up efforts on these issues and to rapidly report back on progress achieved and further possible steps, with a view to the development and implementation of the overall strategy as soon as possible.

11. The European Council reiterates the need for an effective return and readmission policy. It welcomes the progress made on the proposal on common standards in this area and underlines the importance of enhancing cooperation on readmission with third countries, including through the implementation of obligations under existing instruments, and consequently stresses the need to conclude readmission agreements urgently with all major countries of origin and transit.

12. Endorsing the Council's conclusions of 16 June on enhancing the Global Approach to Migration, the European Council underlines the importance of continuing the dialogue, partnership and cooperation with third countries on migration issues in a geographically balanced manner. The Global Approach needs to be further developed, in particular through the development of concrete instruments such as migration missions, cooperation platforms, mobility partnerships and migration profiles. In this respect, the European Council welcomes the launching of Pilot Mobility Partnerships with Cape Verde and the Republic of Moldova and looks forward to the opening of the dialogue on such Partnerships with Georgia and Senegal. The Commission is invited to evaluate the Pilot Mobility Partnerships and report on the results by no later than June 2009.

13. Noting the important progress achieved over recent months in implementing the Union's Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the European Council stresses that efforts to fight terrorism must be stepped up, while fully respecting the rule of law and human rights. In this context the European Council welcomes the new impetus given to the implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy by the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator with his recent report and recommendations. It invites the Commission to continue its work on the prevention of radicalisation and recruitment for terrorism as soon as possible. In its cooperation with third countries the Union should usefully contribute to the prevention of recruitment for terrorism, particularly through the delivery of technical assistance in the fields of education, human rights, rule of law, civil society and governance. The Commission is invited to focus efforts in particular on countries in the North African region and the Sahel, as well as countries in the South Asia region.

14. Access to relevant information by the competent authorities of the Member States and EU agencies is a necessity for efficient prevention of terrorism and serious crime. The European Council therefore stresses the need for a coordinated and coherent approach to the implementation of the principle of availability, aiming for effective use of information technology and information networks. Agreement has been reached on the integration of the provisions on exchange of information in the Prüm Treaty into the Union's legal framework, but further initiatives to enhance the exchange of information should be examined, taking due account of the protection of personal data.

15. In March 2008, the enlargement of the Schengen area by 9 Member States was finalised with the abolition of controls at internal air borders. This contributes to a higher level of mobility without affecting the security of EU citizens. The European Council welcomes the entry into force of the Schengen association agreement with Switzerland and the signature of the Protocol with Liechtenstein. It urges the Member States and the Commission to work closely together and to allocate sufficient resources to ensure that SIS II becomes operational in September 2009. It invites the Commission to present possible solutions for the long-term management of large-scale IT systems in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

16. The European Council welcomes an initiative to progressively establish a uniform EU E-justice portal by the end of 2009.
17. Recalling the European Council conclusions of June 2007 on the overall agreement on the Framework Decision on combating certain forms of racism and xenophobia, the European Council welcomes the first European hearing on crimes committed by totalitarian regimes and acknowledges the need to continue the process.
18. The European Council welcomes the agreement reached on the Directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law and the progress made with regard to the Directive against ship source pollution. The European Council reiterates the importance of achieving a high level of environmental protection throughout the EU. It also welcomes the rapid adoption of the framework decision for enhancing procedural rights in trials in the absence of the person, thus strengthening the procedural guarantees in this area.
19. Efforts to enhance judicial cooperation in civil law matters, including family law, need to continue, considering the positive impact such cooperation can have on citizens in their everyday lives. Important legal acts concerning mediation in civil and commercial matters, the law applicable to contractual obligations and parental responsibility and the protection of children have been adopted; nevertheless, further work is needed. The European Council therefore calls for the Regulation on maintenance obligations to be adopted before the end of 2008 and for a political solution concerning the Regulation on jurisdiction and applicable law in matrimonial matters to be found promptly. The Commission is invited to submit its proposal on succession and wills before the end of 2008.
20. The European Council underlines the need to rapidly follow up on the project to establish a common frame of reference for European contract law.

21. The roles of Eurojust and Europol need to be strengthened, and the cooperation between these two agencies enhanced, with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious cross-border crime. The European Council stresses the importance of the agreement reached at the April 2008 Council on the Decision on establishing Europol and calls for its swift formal adoption in line with the timetable agreed in June 2007. The European Council calls on the Council to rapidly conclude its work with a view to formally adopting before the end of 2008 the draft Council Decision on strengthening Eurojust.

22. The European Council emphasises the need to strengthen cooperation with third countries and international organisations (especially the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the Council of Europe and the United Nations).

23. The European Council strongly supports the aim of having all EU Member States participating as quickly as possible in the U.S. Visa Waiver Programme in order to ensure full reciprocal visa-free travel and equal treatment for all EU citizens as is already the case for U.S. citizens entering the territory of the Member States.

24. The European Council welcomes ongoing efforts to reinforce the Union's disaster-management capacities and stresses the need for a coordinated approach to managing disasters. It invites the Council, the Commission and Member States to take this work forward rapidly.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF HIGH FOOD AND OIL PRICES

25. The recent surge in commodity prices raises concerns both internally, especially as regards low-income households, and abroad, particularly for developing countries which are net food and/or oil importers. It is a complex phenomenon with many root causes and consequences, affecting EU policies across the board. The European Council welcomes the two Commission Communications on these issues.

26. In the agricultural sector the Union has already acted to moderate the pressure on **food prices** through the sale of intervention stocks, the reduction in export refunds, the removal of the set-aside requirement for 2008, the increase in milk quotas, and the suspension of import duties for cereals, thus improving supply and helping to stabilise agricultural markets.

27. Successive reforms of the CAP have enhanced its market orientation, reduced the number of supply management measures and made EU farmers more responsive to price developments. It is important to continue to improve the market orientation of agriculture and thus enable EU farmers to better respond to market signals, while ensuring fair competition and fostering sustainable agriculture across the EU and ensuring an adequate food supply. In the context of the CAP Health Check, the Council will consider further steps to address these issues.

28. There is a need to pursue work on innovation, research and development of agricultural production, notably to enhance its energy efficiency, productivity growth and ability to adapt to climate change.

29. A number of Member States are introducing short-term measures to alleviate the impact of recent food price developments on low-income households. In order to avoid distorting price signals and causing broad-based second-round effects on wages and prices, such measures should be short-term and targeted.

30. The European Council welcomes the Commission's initiative to examine the issue of restrictive regulation in the retail sector in the context of the Single Market Review. The European Council also welcomes the Commission's intention to closely monitor activities in commodity-related financial markets, including speculative trade, and their impact on price movements as well as any policy implications. It invites the Commission to report back on this issue in advance of the December 2008 European Council and to consider proposing adequate policy responses, including measures aimed at improving market transparency.

31. It is important to ensure the sustainability of bio-fuel policies, by setting sustainability criteria for the production of first-generation bio-fuels and by encouraging the development of the second-generation bio-fuels made from by-products. There is also a need to rapidly assess possible impacts on agricultural products for food and to take action, if necessary, to address shortcomings. Further assessment should also be made of the environmental and social consequences of the production, and consumption of bio-fuels, both within the Union and outside. The European Council stresses the importance of fostering coordination with the EU's international partners in that respect.

32. High food prices are putting a particular strain on developing countries. They are severely affecting the situation of the world's poorest populations and are putting at risk progress towards all MDGs. Action is therefore required from the European Union from a development and humanitarian assistance perspective. The European Council welcomes the Commission's intention to come forward with a proposal for a new fund to support agriculture in developing countries, within the framework of the current Financial Perspectives. In its efforts, the Union will work in close liaison with the United Nations and other international organisations and in the framework of partner countries' own policies and strategies.

33. The EU is already providing important food aid and humanitarian assistance in many of the most critical areas and will mobilise resources to finance, beyond food aid, safety nets for poor and vulnerable population groups.

34. The EU will promote a more coordinated and longer-term international response to the current food crisis, in particular in the UN, in international financial institutions and in the context of the G8. It accordingly welcomes the establishment by the UNSG of the High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis. The EU is determined to play its full part in implementing the Declaration agreed in Rome on 5 June 2008 at the FAO High Level Conference on World Food Security.
35. The EU will use its policy dialogue with third countries in a transparent manner to discourage food export restrictions and export bans. It will also raise this issue in the WTO and other relevant international fora. Furthermore, the EU will continue to strive for a comprehensive, ambitious and balanced conclusion of the Doha Round.
36. The EU will support a strong agricultural supply response in developing countries, providing in particular the necessary financing for agricultural inputs and assistance in using market-based risk management instruments. It will significantly enhance its support to public and private investments in agriculture and more generally encourage developing countries to develop better agriculture policies, especially to support food security and reinforce regional integration. Particular attention will be paid to small-scale farmers and enhancing energy efficiency.
37. The European Council expresses concern in regard to the continued surge in **oil and gas prices** and their social and economic consequences. Measures can be considered to alleviate the impact of higher oil and gas prices on the poorer sections of the population, but should remain short-term and targeted. The European Council welcomes the Commission's intention to propose some short term measures targeted to underpin the long term process of restructuring the fisheries sector. Distortionary fiscal and other policy interventions should be avoided as they prevent the necessary adjustment by economic agents. The European Council invites the incoming Presidency in cooperation with the Commission to examine the feasibility and impact of measures to smooth the effects of sudden oil and gas price increases and report before the October European Council.

38. These developments underscore the need to rapidly adopt the climate change and energy package, many elements of which can help alleviate the situation. Further efforts to increase energy efficiency and energy savings and diversify the EU energy supply are essential. In particular new technologies, have an important role to play in that respect. The European Council invites Member States, the Commission and the European Investment Bank to support measures aimed at facilitating investments by households and industry in energy efficiency and use of renewable energy sources as well as a more environmentally-friendly use of fossil fuels. The European Council urges the Member States and the Commission to expedite the implementation of the 2006 Action Plan on energy efficiency and consider its possible revision. It also notes that the Commission will soon bring forward proposals to revise the energy taxation and eurovignette directives.
39. Other measures should rapidly be examined, in particular to promote competition in energy markets, promote modernisation of transport systems including the development of alternative technologies, inter alia, electric cars, as well as increase the transparency of oil markets, including as regards oil stocks. The dialogue with oil and gas companies, producing countries and importing developing countries should be enhanced, both at European level and at international level, to ensure better response of supply to market needs and to improve the framework conditions for investment in exploration, production, refining capacity and alternative energy sources. In this respect the European Council welcomes the decision by Saudi Arabia to call a meeting between oil producer and consumer countries in Jeddah on 22 June.
40. The European Council takes particular note of the Commission's intention to monitor food and oil price developments in Europe and internationally, and looks forward to the Commission's report on the evolution of the situation ahead of the December 2008 European Council. The European Council also encourages the Commission to monitor developments in other commodity-related markets. Considering the wide range of policy sectors affected by the high food and energy prices, the European Council invites the GAERC to follow closely the work conducted in the relevant Council configurations on this issue and report back by October 2008.

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

41. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the historic decision to launch the euro and the creation of the European Central Bank, the European Council salutes the remarkable success of the first decade of economic and monetary union. This success must be built upon to meet the economic challenges that lie ahead. The European Council calls on the Council to reflect on ways of strengthening the implementation of the economic framework for EMU, in the light of the Commission's communication on "EMU@10", so as to ensure that the full potential and benefits of the single currency are realised.
42. The European Council congratulates Slovakia on the convergence achieved since its accession to the EU, based on sound economic and financial policies, and welcomes Slovakia's fulfilment of all the convergence criteria as set out in the Treaty. In this context, the European Council welcomes the Commission's proposal that Slovakia should adopt the euro on 1 January 2009.
43. The European Council notes that international financial markets are showing signs of stabilisation, but that overall conditions remain fragile. The updated comprehensive work plan, adopted last October in response to the financial turmoil, is being implemented as planned and should be completed by the end of 2008. The European Council invites the Council to continue to monitor the situation closely.
44. The EU remains committed to maintaining international leadership on climate change and energy. The European Council welcomes the progress made on an ambitious, global and comprehensive post-2012 agreement on climate change at the negotiations in Bangkok in April and in Bonn in June 2008. The pace of negotiations needs to accelerate in order to come to an agreement in Copenhagen in 2009 consistent with the 2°C limit. With the aim of agreeing on an EU position at the Spring 2009 European Council, the Commission is invited to present a comprehensive strategy for scaling up finance and investment flows for both mitigation and adaptation in response to the Bali Action Plan, including mechanisms for research and development in, and the dissemination and transfer of, safe and sustainable low-carbon technology.

45. In order to maintain international leadership and credibility the European Union must rapidly reach an agreement on its climate and energy package. The European Council therefore welcomes the progress achieved to date on the different proposals in the climate and energy legislative package and urges the Council to work in close cooperation with the European Parliament towards an agreement in line with the principles and time targets set at its March 2008 meeting. The European Council calls on the Commission to bring forward as soon as possible a mechanism to incentivise Member State and private sector investment to ensure the construction and operation by 2015 of up to 12 demonstration plants of commercial power generation with carbon capture and storage, as agreed by the European Council in spring 2007. In this context the European Council reaffirms the need for coherent policies and instruments exploiting the synergies relating to Energy and Climate Change, in all economic sectors concerned, i.a., the transport sector.
46. The European Council welcomes broad agreement reached on essential elements of the internal energy market legislative package, in particular on the issue of effective separation of supply and production activities from network operations in the gas and electricity sectors. The European Council urges the Council and the European Parliament to reach final agreement on the package before the end of the current legislative term.
47. The European Council welcomes the successful outcome of the 9th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity as a fundamental step towards achieving the 2010 target.
48. Further to the political agreements reached by the Council on the Directive on working time and on the Directive on working conditions for temporary workers, the European Council calls on the Council and the European Parliament to reach a balanced final agreement on both Directives before the end of the current legislative term.

49. The European Council looks forward to the results of the Commission's evaluation of existing policies and instruments aimed at improving the inclusion of the Roma population as well as to the forthcoming conference on this issue to be held in September. It invites the Council to take this into account in its examination of the revised Social Agenda. The European Council will return to this issue before the end of the year.
50. European Council underlines the importance of closing the gap in health and in life expectancy between and within Member States and stresses the importance of prevention activities in the field of major chronic non-communicable diseases. In this respect it welcomes the Council Conclusions on reducing the burden of cancer, which can contribute to the achievement of these goals.
51. The European Council welcomes the decision to establish the EIT in Budapest. This will allow the Institute to rapidly begin its work with a view to promoting European innovation. In that context, the European Council recalls the conclusions of the representatives of the Member States, meeting at Head of State or Government level in Brussels on 13 December 2003, that give priority to newly Acceding States in the distribution of the seats of community offices or agencies to be set up in the future. Seats of future offices or agencies should be primarily located in the Member States that acceded to the Union in or after 2004, while appropriate priority should be given to the Member States that do not already host an EU office or agency.

WESTERN BALKANS

52. The European Council reaffirms its full support for the European perspective of the Western Balkans, as set out in the Thessaloniki Agenda and the Salzburg Declaration. Recalling its conclusions of December 2006, the European Council stresses that by making solid progress in economic and political reform and by fulfilling the necessary conditions and requirements, the remaining potential candidates in the Western Balkans should achieve candidate status, according to their own merits, with EU membership as ultimate goal. The EU perspective remains essential for the stability, reconciliation and the future of the Western Balkans.
53. The Stabilisation and Association Process remains the framework for the European course of the Western Balkans. The progress achieved in recent years in this context, in particular through the conclusion of Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs), now needs to be further consolidated.
54. The European Council welcomes the significant progress in facilitating people-to-people contacts for the countries of the region. In this regard the European Council welcomes the successful launching of the dialogue on visa liberalisation with Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on the roadmaps containing clear and realistic benchmarks. The European Council also endorses the Declaration on the Western Balkans as set out in the Annex.
55. The European Council stresses again the importance of regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations. It welcomes the transition from the Stability Pact to the Regional Cooperation Council and encourages the region to further enhance regional ownership as discussed at the recent South-Eastern Europe Cooperation Process ministerial meeting in Sofia and summit meeting in Pomorie.

56. The European Council underlines that further steps by the **former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** in its progress towards the EU are possible by the end of this year, provided that the conditions set out in the December 2005 European Council conclusions, the Copenhagen political criteria and the key priorities of the February 2008 accession partnership are met. In this context the European Council takes note of the conclusions of the GAERC of 16 June 2008. Maintaining good neighbourly relations, including a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution on the name issue, remains essential. The EU welcomes **Albania's** commitment to ensure the conditions for free, fair and democratic elections which must take place in 2009. Further efforts with regard to institutional capacities in public administration, the fight against corruption and organised crime as well as in the judiciary will be of similar importance. The European Council takes note of the progress **Montenegro** has made and encourages the country to further focus on building administrative capacity, pursuing the fight against corruption and organised crime, consolidating the institutions as well as reforms of the judiciary in accordance with the Constitution. To reach the next stage in their respective relations with the EU, Albania and Montenegro must also establish a convincing track record of successful SAA implementation. The European Council welcomes the recent signature of the SAA with **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, which constitutes an important step in that country's European course. Bosnia and Herzegovina must continue with the implementation of the reform process without delay, particularly with a view to fulfilling the objectives and conditions for the transition from the Office of the High Representative to the European Union Special Representative. The European Council looks forward to a new Government in Belgrade with a clear European agenda to push forward with necessary reforms. Building on the recent signature of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU, **Serbia** can accelerate its progress towards the EU, including candidate status, as soon as all necessary conditions are met in accordance with the GAERC conclusions of 29 April 2008. Recalling the European Council's conclusions of December 2007 and the GAERC conclusions of 18 February 2008 the European Union remains committed to playing a leading role in ensuring the stability of **Kosovo**, also through EULEX Kosovo, EUSR and its contribution to an international civilian office as part of the international presences. The EU welcomes the UNSG's report on UNMIK and, as is described in his report, his intention to reconfigure the international civil presence in Kosovo.

This would facilitate the deployment of EULEX KOSOVO throughout Kosovo and allow for an enhanced operational role of the EU in the area of rule of law. The European Council also welcomes Kosovo commitment to the principles of democracy and equality of all its citizens, the protection of the Serb and other minorities, the protection of religious and cultural heritage as well as international presence. The European Council expresses its support to the forthcoming Donors' Conference and encourages bilateral and multilateral donors to pledge assistance. The EU recalls its willingness to assist the economic and political development of Kosovo through a clear European perspective, in line with the European perspective of the region.

EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Millennium Development Goals

57. The year 2008 should mark a turning point in enhancing the collective efforts to eradicate poverty in the context of sustainable development, in order to ensure that by 2015 all the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will be achieved worldwide. In the light of progress made in some countries and areas, the European Council is convinced that all MDGs can still be attained in all regions of the world, provided that concerted action is taken immediately and in a sustained manner until 2015. However, it is seriously concerned about the trend in many countries and regions, in particular sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of achievement of the MDGs.

58. The EU will continue to play a leading role as the world's largest donor and will make all necessary efforts to ensure an ambitious action-oriented response before, during and after the key events to be held in the second half of this year: the third High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Accra, 2-4 September), the UN High-Level Event on the MDGs (New York, 25 September) and the International Conference on Financing for Development (Doha, 29 November-2 December).

59. The European Council fully endorses the Council conclusions of May 2008, which provide a strong collective EU response to the global development challenge. In particular, with a view to attaining all MDGs, the EU strongly reaffirms its commitment to achieve a collective ODA target of 0,56% GNI by 2010 and 0,7% GNI by 2015, as set out in the May 2005 Council conclusions, the June 2005 European Council conclusions and the European Consensus on Development. These commitments should see annual EU ODA double to over EUR 66 billion in 2010. At least half of this collective increase will be allocated to Africa. Member States are encouraged to establish their indicative timetables illustrating how they aim to achieve their agreed ODA targets.

60. The EU will undertake radical reforms to improve aid effectiveness, building on the full implementation of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the 2005 European Consensus on Development and the 2007 EU Code of Conduct on complementarity and division of labour.

61. The EU will continue to improve policy coherence for development (PCD) in the twelve areas identified in 2005, ensuring furthermore that the PCD principles are part of the international agenda for the MDGs and aid effectiveness.

62. The EU will fully implement the 2007 EU Strategy on Aid for Trade, striving to achieve its collective target of EUR 2 billion spending on EU trade-related assistance annually by 2010 (EUR 1 billion from the Member States and EUR 1 billion from the European Community) and to increase overall Aid for Trade in coherence with the increases in overall ODA. In the range of 50% of the increase in the collective EU trade-related assistance will be available for ACP countries.

63. The European Council welcomes the EU Agenda for Action on MDGs. The EU proposes to its partners in development to share this agenda, which identifies, within time frames, specific milestones and actions in the context of pro-poor growth development in key areas, such as the reduction of poverty and hunger, education, health, environment, gender equality and the empowerment of women, water, agriculture, private sector and infrastructure, that will contribute to ensure the achievement of the MDGs by 2015.

64. The EU is determined to provide an effective collective response to the new challenges to development posed in particular by climate change and high food prices. With regard to climate change, the EU is determined, where relevant, to help developing countries, particularly poor developing countries most vulnerable to climate change, to move towards sustainable economic growth and to adapt to climate change, in line with the agreement reached in Bali to launch negotiations aimed at securing a global agreement on climate change in Copenhagen in 2009. It will work for the effective implementation of the 2007 "Global Climate Change Alliance" and will explore ways to mobilise new financial resources to tackle climate change and combat its negative impact. In this context, the EU will work, inter alia, on the basis of the Commission proposal for a global financing mechanism.

Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean

65. The Mediterranean region is an area of vital strategic importance to the European Union in political, economic and social terms. The Barcelona Process has been the central instrument for Euro-Mediterranean relations since 1995 and has allowed the strong promotion of multilateral and bilateral cooperation. Building on and reinforcing previous successes, the "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean" will inject further momentum into the Union's relations with the Mediterranean. It will complement ongoing bilateral relations which will continue within existing policy frameworks.
66. The European Council welcomes the Commission's Communication of 20 May 2008 and, in particular, the proposals to add an enhanced political and institutional dimension to the EU's relations with Mediterranean partners through a new political impetus, notably by holding biennial summits, and to reinforce the shared ownership of the Partnership through the establishment of a co-presidency with due regard for the relevant provisions of the Treaties.
67. On this basis, the EU will conduct the necessary consultations with all Euro-Mediterranean partners with a view to preparing a joint declaration to be adopted at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean on 13 July 2008.

Eastern Partnership

68. The European Council welcomes the proposals for developing the eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which will aim at enhancing EU policy towards eastern ENP partners in bilateral and multilateral formats.
69. The European Council agrees on the need to further promote regional cooperation among the EU's eastern neighbours and between the EU and the region, as well as bilateral cooperation between the EU and each of these countries respectively, on the basis of differentiation and an individual approach, respecting the character of the ENP as a single and coherent policy framework. Furthermore, such cooperation should bring added value and be complementary to the already existing and planned multilateral cooperation under and related to the ENP, in particular the Black Sea Synergy and the Northern Dimension.
70. In line with this, the European Council invites the Commission to take the work forward and to present to the Council in Spring 2009 a proposal for modalities of the "Eastern Partnership", on the basis of relevant initiatives.

Other issues

71. The European Council welcomes the encouraging progress made in implementing the Union's Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia adopted in June 2007. It looks forward to further strengthening the Union's partnership with Central Asia.

72. The European Council remains deeply concerned by the situation in Zimbabwe and reiterates the need for the upcoming second round of presidential elections on 27 June to be held in a peaceful, free and fair environment in accordance with international norms and standards. Violence so far, intimidation and action taken against NGOs to suspend aid and international access to rural areas, heighten further the fears of the Zimbabwean people and the international community about the conditions under which this poll, crucial for the future of Zimbabwe, will be held. The European Union regrets that its offer to provide monitors has been rejected. It is vital that ordinary Zimbabweans vote on election day and their votes are counted swiftly and transparently in accordance with the Southern Africa Development Community's own rules and standards. Zimbabweans should be allowed to choose their future freely, which will open the way for delivering political stability to the country. A free and fair presidential runoff is critical to the resolution of the ongoing crisis. The European Council calls on the SADC and the African Union to deploy a significant number of election monitors as soon as possible and to ensure their continued presence until the electoral process is completed and results officially declared. The European Council reiterates its readiness to take additional measures against those responsible for violence. The EU stands ready to support and reengage with a democratic, legitimate and reform-minded government in Zimbabwe.
73. The European Council took note of the discussion by the GAERC on 16 June of the situation in Sudan. It is deeply concerned about the lack of cooperation with the ICC by the Sudanese authorities and calls on the Government of Sudan to work constructively with the ICC, the EU and with the international community. The European Council called on the GAERC to continue to follow developments in Sudan closely and contemplate additional measures in case of lack of full cooperation with the UN and other institutions, including the ICC.

74. The European Union expresses its continuing deep concern about the humanitarian situation in Burma/Myanmar following Cyclone Nargis. It welcomes the efforts of the UN and ASEAN and the resulting increase in aid reaching the 2.4 million people affected by the Cyclone, but calls on the authorities of Burma/Myanmar to remove all remaining restrictions on the distribution of international aid. The European Council underlines that while the immediate priority is humanitarian relief, the need for a genuine transition to democracy in Burma/Myanmar is stronger than ever. It deeply regrets the decision of the authorities of Burma/Myanmar to renew Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest and reiterates its call for the release of all political prisoners. The European Council regrets that the way the referendum was conducted did not contribute to an inclusive and transparent process of national reconciliation, which is the only path to prosperity and stability in the country. The European Council calls on the authorities to ensure that the elections announced for 2010 will be prepared and conducted in a way that contributes to a credible and fully participative transition to democracy. In this regard, the European Council welcomes the UN Secretary-General's personal engagement and underlines its full support for his good offices mission.
75. The European Council welcomes the Lima Declaration issued at the recent EU/Latin America and Caribbean Summit and calls for the necessary efforts to be made to conclude the subregional negotiations by 2009.
76. The European Council endorses the Presidency Report on ESDP, which includes the mandate for the incoming Presidency. The European Council also endorses the Annual report on EU activities in the framework of conflict prevention; incoming Presidencies are invited to build on the substantial progress made so as to make the Union more coherent, capable and active in this area.

77. The European Council reaffirms that the promotion and protection of the rights of the child, in particular children affected by armed conflict, is a priority of the EU's external action. The European Council calls on the Commission and Member States to continue ensuring coherence, complementarity and coordination of human rights, security and development policies and programmes, in order to address the short, medium and long-term impacts of armed conflict on children in an effective, sustainable and comprehensive manner.
78. The European Council acknowledges efforts to promote the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. In this context it recognises the value of cultural cooperation and intercultural dialogue as an integral part of all relevant external policies, in line with the recommendations of the conference on "New Paradigms, New Models & Culture in the EU's External Relations" and the work underway within the framework of the Alliance of Civilizations. The European Council underlines the importance of cultural cooperation in addressing political processes and challenges, based on dialogue with civil society, in promoting people-to-people contacts and in fostering good neighbourly relations.
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DECLARATION ON THE WESTERN BALKANS

Considerable efforts have been made to render the European perspective of the Western Balkans more tangible and visible to the people across the region. With reference to the Commission's Communication "Western Balkans: Enhancing the European Perspective" the European Council underlines the importance of the following three areas:

1) Extending Community policies to the Western Balkans and enhancing regional cooperation

In order to deepen the ongoing cooperation between the EU and the region, which enjoys a European perspective, and to enhance regional cooperation, the European Council:

- calls for efforts to encourage the participation of the Western Balkans countries in **Community programmes and agencies**;
- looks forward to the launching of negotiations to establish a **Transport Community Treaty with the Western Balkans** as well as to their early conclusion;
- recognises the importance of effective implementation of the **Energy Community** in South East Europe;
- Stresses the importance of **cooperation and reforms in the field of freedom, security and justice**, sharing EU experiences in combating organised crime and terrorism and recommends the preparation of the first South East European organised crime threat assessment to be coordinated by the SECI Center in Bucharest;
- recognises the importance of promoting **judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters**;
- welcomes progress made in associating the Western Balkans with the Community **Civil Protection Mechanism** and underlines the intention of the European Commission to further strengthen cooperation, including by launching a Disaster Risk Reduction Initiative;
- acknowledges the importance of the transition from the Stability Pact to the **Regional Cooperation Council** as well as of the cooperation undertaken through the **Central European Free Trade Agreement** and pledges full support to these forms of regionally owned co-operation.

2) Facilitation of people-to-people contacts and development of civil society

Promoting people-to-people contacts between the Western Balkans and the EU is of the utmost importance, as it facilitates a better mutual understanding and reconciliation and promotes the principles upon which the EU is founded. Therefore the European Council:

- welcomes the successful launching of the dialogue on **visa liberalisation** as mentioned in paragraph 54 of the European Council conclusions;
- supports the intention of the Commission to offer more **scholarships** for students from the Western Balkans under Erasmus Mundus;
- recognises the importance of the "**Steering platform on research for the Western Balkans**". It calls for the continuation of cooperation in the area of science and research;
- supports the establishment of a new Facility under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) to promote **civil society** development and dialogue in the Western Balkans, while strengthening partnership and networking with civil society counterparts from the EU.

3) Economic and social development and strengthening of good governance

The EU will continue to work closely with the Western Balkans to strengthen socio-economic development and good governance and will support further progress and reforms in the region.

With this aim the European Council:

- welcomes the initiative to establish a comprehensive **Western Balkans Investment Framework** by 2010. It calls for swift implementation of the objectives mentioned in the ECOFIN Conclusions of 14 May 2008;
- acknowledges the work done by the **Regional School of Public Administration (ReSPA)** and calls for its development into a fully fledged school;
- recognises the fundamental **contribution of cultural cooperation** in promoting European values and intercultural dialogue in the Western Balkans, and thus fostering democratisation, reconciliation and respect for human rights.